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Abstract: We demonstrate the distribution of polarization-entangled
photons for the purpose of quantum key distribution (QKD) along active
telecom fibers. Entangled photon pairs of 810 nm wavelength generated by
a Sagnac interferometer source were coupled into standard telecom single
mode fibers. The fibers were either dark or carrying a standardized 1550 nm
ethernet signals (1000BASE-ZX) with a nominal speed of 1 GBps from
regular media converter devices, without any requirements on the optical
power or spectrum transmitted. Our system demonstrates a QKD network
covering 6 km in distance with a central service provider for classical and
quantum data.
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Introduction
Quantum key distribution (QKD) offers an alternative to existing key exchange protocols such
as RSA, discrete logarithms[1] or trusted couriers by using individual quanta as the informa-
tion carriers, which cannot be altered without introducing errors to their state. QKD systems
may either use discrete variables represented by single photons (BB84 protocol[2]), or entan-
gled photons (BBM92 protocol[3]) , or continuous variables represented in the quadratures of
light[4]. QKD has been demonstrated over free space links [5, 6, 7] as well as fiber links [8, 9].
If QKD is to be adopted in real-world applications, it must be compatible with existing commu-
nications infrastructure. Most fiber-based implementations of QKD use ‘dark fibers’ dedicated
solely to quantum information [10, 11], an expensive usage of resources, or use parts of the
optical spectrum which currently have low volume of traffic[12, 13, 14, 15, 16]. Telecom wave-
lengths are used for the QKD signal in order to minimize attenuation, but lead to extra dark
counts due to four-wave mixing processes between classical channels [12]. Noise cancellation
or power regulation of the classical signal are required to counteract this effect. Additionally,
difficult to operate InGaAs photon detectors or superconducting detectors must be used for
these longer wavelength photons[17].
A multi-user network QKD system [18], such as a group of buildings within the same orga-
nization, with a central service provider for both classical and quantum data connections is
envisioned. An entangled photon source is installed at this central location where the intranet
connections between buildings are controlled in-house and are physically realized with fiber-
optic links at telecom wavelengths. When two entities want to make a secure connection, they
request that the server room connect them to the source through the fiber optic links. Next,
they each perform measurements on their entangled photons received from the source, and thus
perform key growth according to the BBM92 protocol.
In this work, we show a simple and efficient solution for the compatibility of quantum and clas-
sical traffic without contraints on the classical traffic. We use polarization-entangled 810 nm
photons travelling in 1550 nm single mode fibers (SMF). While it has been shown that
entanglement-based [19] and single photon QKD [20] are possible on dark telecom fibers;
we now show that entanglement-based QKD at visible wavelengths can readily be incorporated
into existing active telecom fibers with a simple system. 810 nm photons are much more atten-
uated in optical fiber than 1550 nm (3 dB/km compared to 0.2 dB/km) which limits the total
distance of the system, however at short distances we expect this wavelength to outperform
infrared secure key rates due the use of higher efficiency SiAPD detectors.
Implementation
As in Figure 1, the two photons output by a Sagnac source [21] were coupled into SMF for 810
nm and then into symmetric telecom fiber links and then sent to Alice and Bob for detection.
Fused biconical taper fiber beamsplitters in SMF were used to combine the gigabit ethernet
signals at 1550 nm (from a 1000BASE-ZX transceiver with an optical power of 0.55 mW) with
the 810 nm entangled photons. Commercially available common fiber splitters split 1550 nm
signals equally among outputs, but the 810 nm photons couple only weakly to the branching
port and are mostly preserved [24]. The classical signals travelled along the fiber in the direc-
tions opposite to the quantum signals to minimize background counts in the quantum receivers.
Traffic in the link was generated by using the secure copy protocol [22] to transfer files on a
local area network and measured using shallow packet inspection [23].
At both outputs of the fiber channels, 1550 nm SMF fiber splitters were used to extract the clas-
sical signals. The other outputs of the fiber splitters were passed through a 5 nm wide bandpass
810 nm filter to remove stray telecom signal and then through a polarization analyzer which
split the photons to four different silicon photon avalanche photodiodes (Si-APD, Perkin-Elmer
SPCM Quad Array) based on their polarization (rectilinear (H,V) or diagonal (+,-)). The APDs
were attached to a timetagging unit which passed the time and state of the signals to Alice and
Bob’s computers for post-processing.
Waveguide theory predicts that two orders for the spatial modes of 810 nm light may propagate
in 1550 nm SMF [24], and these will differ in group velocity by about 2.2 ns per km of fiber
[25]. Spatial and temporal filtering was performed to exclude the second-order propagation
mode from the first-order mode, by using the mode selectivity of a 2 m single-mode fiber for
810 nm applied just before detection of the photons, and post-processing the arrival times of
the photons to filter out the photons arriving in the delayed second-order mode [19]. This suc-
cessfully increased the received entanglement visibility from 62% (unfiltered) to 95% (filtered)
at the cost of only about half of photon pairs.
Alice and Bob communicate along a separate classical link to find the time offset needed to
maximize the coincidences in their detection events. Thus they can compare detection events to
Fig. 1. Schematic of experimental apparatus. Two fiber splitters (represented by circles
in this diagram) connect the 1550 nm fiber links. Classical information (represented by
solid lines) travels in the opposite direction along the fiber as the quantum information
(represented by dashed lines) and is generated by copper to optical media converters. For
details on the polarization analyzer, see [5], for details on the photon source, see [21].
calculate the entanglement visibility and the quantum bit error rate (QBER). The QBER is an
important measure because it ensures the integrity of the secrecy of the communication [26] -
to maintain the security of the key distribution, the QBER should be at least less than 11%, the
threshold for QKD in the infinite key limit[27].
Coincident detection rates and QBERs were measured for total fiber lengths between 0.5 and
6 km for sufficient duration that the minimum number of raw key bits required to generate a
secret key in the finite key limit[28] were obtained.
Results
System Characterization
We observed the light after fiber transmission using a spectrometer in order to quantify the
interaction of our short-wavelength quantum and long-wavelength classical signals. Measure-
ments of the spectrum of the quantum signal were taken with no classical signal, and with the
classical signal in either parallel or opposite propagation directions on a 2 km long fiber. Re-
sults of these measurements are presented in figure 2.
The parallel propagation direction introduced more photons into the fiber around the wave-
length of the quantum signal, between 820 and 840 nm. This indicates that some mixing pro-
cess occured between the quantum signal at 810 nm and the classical signal at 1550 nm. The
opposite propagation direction introduced negligible background photons to our quantum sig-
Fig. 2. Signal spectrum in (a) is intensity averaged in bins of 1 nm, for various signal
configurations on 2 km of 1550 nm SMF. (b) is the total detected counts per second with
classical signal opposite. In (b), the counts in the no-signal case are the total detector dark
counts per arm. Statistical error on the count number is smaller than the size of the data
point.
nal, and so this propagation direction was used in experiment. The classical signal produced on
average 500 extra counts per detector, regardless of the length of the fiber or the presence of
quantum signal. For implementations using optical communication standards other than what
we used, further investigation of the background suppression is required.
From the coincidence and single detection rates, we estimate that our source is producing en-
tangled pairs at a rate of 0.4 MHz.
QKD Results
The observed QBER versus fiber length between the server and Alice or Bob for both active
and dark fibers is presented in figure 3. At all lengths measured (0.25, 0.5, 1, 2, and 3 km for
each channel) the QBER for active fibers was the same to within a few percentage points as the
QBER for dark fibers.
All active-fiber experiments were conducted with around 10 Mbps of traffic on the fibers. An
additional experiment was conducted at 4 km each between the server and Alice or Bob, where
the traffic was varied between 0 and 100 Mbps, with negligible effect on the QBER (figure 4).
The media converters used in this experiment transmitted with the same intensity on idle as at
100 Mbps so the QBER was expected to be independent of traffic.
From the measured QBER we calculated the lower bound on the estimated secure key rate [29].
Simulations of secure key rate for the fiber lengths used in this experiment with appropriate
variables were calculated [30] and compared to secure key rates estimated with experimentally
obtained QBER. Simulated QBER was larger than measured due to relaxation in polarization
alignment in the fibers. QBER increased significantly at 3 km fiber lengths due the the difficulty
in aligning polarization with few photon detector counts. Asymptotic analysis [29] predicts
positive secure key rate up to 6km fiber lengths but the increased QBER made it impossible to
get secure keys with finite size statistics [28].
Fig. 3. QBER (a) and SKR (b) for varying lengths of fiber per arm, which are dark (no
telecom signals introduced) or with telecom signals carrying 10.5 Mbps of traffic. The
observed QBER is larger than predicted by theory at longer lengths due to the difficulty in
aligning polarization bases with attenuated count rates, even at the maximum source rate.
SKR was simulated using the mathematical descriptions of detectors and SPDC sources of
entangled photons described in [29], with experimental and ideal parameters.
Fig. 4. QBER for varying levels of telecom traffic, averaged in bins of 10 s. The QBER
increases slightly over time due to polarization drift, but is unaffected by classical traffic.
Conclusion
We have demonstrated high-visibility key distribution over active telecom fibers over total fiber
lengths up to 3 km, and with symmetric links this leads to total distances of 6 km, without
disruption of either classical or quantum signal. The standard we have used is not as common
for short links, which operate at 1310 nm, but a brief investigation of our system on an installed
2 km link operating at 1310 nm did not result in any difficulties. Further investigation of the
mixing process between quantum and classical signal may be required for optical communica-
tion standards where the spectrum is different than the one we used. We expect that this distance
can be extended in the future, since simulations indicate that if the entangled source could op-
erate at 15 Mpairs/s, which is about one order of magnitude greater then our current Sagnac
source but within the range of pair rates generated by previous experiments [6], the quantum
signals could span a distance of 16 km.
We believe the system demonstrated here is a very elegant and effective approach for creating a
multi-node QKD network. Integration of QKD into existing infrastructures means that security-
critical organizations spanning many kilometers of diameter, such as within a city center or a
campus, could ensure that their information is indefinitely secure. Note that our combination
of the QKD signals with the classical signal can be achieved with very simple, robust and cost-
effective technology, and does not place restrictions on the classical traffic. QKD systems using
our approach can be easily incoporated into existing active single mode fiber networks, only
requiring minor alterations to existing communication channels.
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